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4 from Perseus Tools and Information

1. Alea: Greece [Atlas site] (7.87)

2. Alea: Greece [Atlas site] (7.87)

3. Tegea [Atlas site] (7.05)

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88 from Greek and Roman Materials

1. Tegea: Detail of foundations of Temple of Athena Alea from SE [Image] (20.21)

2. West Pediment from the Temple of Athena Alea: Late Classical; Marble; Fight between Telephos and Achilles at the River Kaikos [Sculpture] (13.04)

3. Tegea, Temple of Athena Alea: Reconstruction drawing of interior of the Temple of Athena Alea at Tegea [Image] (12.91)

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2 from Beazley Archive

1. Piali, Museum: SQUAT LEKYTHOS; LM PAINTER; WOMAN WITH MIRROR, TENDRIL [Beazley Archive Vase] (4.90)

2. Cambridge, Fitzwilliam Museum, GR3.1976: SQUAT LEKYTHOS; MEIDIAS PAINTER; WOMEN, ONE SEATED BETWEEN YOUTHS (EROTES) APHRODITE (?), ONE WITH SACRIFICIAL BASKET, TREES [Beazley Archive Vase] (3.61)

1 from CCSD thèses-EN-ligne

1. Shahidi, Niousha; L'HYPOTHESE DE L'ESPERANCE D'UTILITE EN ASSURANCE: Cette these est consacree a l'etude du probleme d'assurance optimale en information symetrique et asymetrique quand il y a un nombre infini d'etats de la nature. Dans une premiere partie, on s'interesse a la determination des contrats Pareto-optimaux dans les modeles d'Esperance d'Utilite non additifs dans le risque et l'incertain. Dans le risque, on montre en particulier que si l'un des deux agents est neutre au risque alors le contrat avec franchise ou le contrat avec une indemnite constante pour les grandes pertes reste un resultat tres robuste. Un deuxieme resultat important est que si l'assureur et l'assure ont de l'aversion forte pour le risque alors les richesses optimales sont des fonctions decroissantes de la perte. Dans l'incertain, on montre d'une part que lorsque les agents ont des preferences a la Choquet avec des capacites identiques, l'ensemble des contrats optimaux est le meme que dans le cas d'Esperance d'Utilite (EU). D'autre part, lorsque les agents ont des capacites differentes (epsilon-contamination) avec des utilites indexees concaves, l'ensemble des contrats optimaux est comparable a celui du modele EU. La deuxieme partie est consacree au probleme d'assurance optimale en information asymetrique. Les problemes rencontres dans cette partie sont des problemes non convexes dont on fournira des resultats d'existence de solution. Deux axes d'etude ont ete abordes: l'alea moral et l'anti-selection. En alea moral, on caracterise le contrat optimal de l'assureur en monopole avec un continum d'efforts possibles pour l'assure. Ce contrat est tel que la richesse optimale de l'assure est une fonction decroissane de la perte. En anti-selection, on considere le cas de monopole et de concurrence. On s'interesse a la caractrisation d'un equilibre a la Rothschild Stiglitz (R.-S.). Les travaux existants dans ce domaine utilisent des raisonnements graphiques, d'ou la difficulte de formuler le probleme dans un cas continu de perte. On demontre que si un equilibre separateur a la R.-S. existe alors les hauts risques obtiennent l'assurance complete a un prix actuariellement juste et le contrat des bas risques est la solution optimale d'un probleme d'optimisation non convexe. De plus, comme en monopole la richesse optimale des bas risques est une fonction decroissante de la perte. ---------- This thesis deals with the problem of optimal insurance contratcts under symmetric and unsymmetric information in infinite dimension. In the first part, we consider the problem of Pareto-optimal insurance contracts under symmetric information when the insurer and the insured have a behaviour that does not conform to expected utility. We consider both the case of risk and the case of uncertainty. In the case of risk, we obtain that if one agent of the agents is risk neutral, contracts with a deductible or with an upper limit are very robust. We next prove that when both agents are strongly risk averse, agents' efficient wealth are non increasing functions of the loss. In the case of uncertainty, we consider agents that are Choquet Expected utility maximizers. When agents have common capacities, we show that optimal contracts are the sameas if agents were expected utility maximizers with same probability. When agents have different epsilon-contaminations of the same prior, we show that if the insurer is less uncertainty averse than the insured, then the insurer provides a full insurance contract above a deductible for high values of the loss. In the second part, we introduce optimal contracts under asymmetric information. We study non-convex problems and the purpose of this part is to give existence result of a solution to such problems. Under moral hazard, we characterize the optimal contract of the monopolistic insurer. Under adverse selection, we consider both monopoly case and competition case. We provide an extension of the Rothschild Stiglitz separating equilibrium in infinite dimension when it exists. We prove that the high-risk consumers obtain full insurance. The low-risk consumers obtain a contract, solution of a non-convex problem, such that their optimal wealth is a non increasing function of the loss. [Text] [View with Perseus links] (0.47)

1 from CIMI Metadata Harvesting Working Group Demonstration Repository

1. Dubuffet, Jean; Aleatory Sites: "Aleatory site with two people" (Sites aleatoires- "Site aleatoire avec 2 personnages"): Acrylic on paper mounted on canvas [Image] (5.45)

4 from OCLC Online Computer Library Center Theses and Dissertations Repository

1. Wollman, William A.,--1930-; The effect of a contemporary compositional process derived from aleatory techniques on the musicality of college level non-music majors /--William A. Wollman.: Thesis -- Ed. D. degree -- New York University, 1972., Includes bibliography. [Text] (2.44)

2. Ballard, Gerald,--1931-; Aleatory music of the twentieth century and its relationship to the social and cultural theories of Pitirim A. Sorokin and Baker Brownell.: Photocopy of typescript., Vita., Thesis (Ed. D.)--University of Tennessee., Bibliography: a?IJN.165-170. [Text] (2.24)

3. Hedges, Stephen A.; A history of aleatory music /--Stephen A. Hedges.: Thesis (M. Mus.)--Bowling Green State University. [Text] (2.00)

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