Xenophon, Memorabilia

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Xenophon, Memorabilia

Editions and translations: Greek | English
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I. I have often wondered by what arguments those who drew up the indictment against Socrates could persuade the Athenians that his life was forfeit to the state. The indictment against him was to this effect: Socrates is guilty of rejecting the gods acknowledged by the state and of bringing in strange deities: he is also guilty of corrupting the youth.

[2] First then, that he rejected the gods acknowledged by the state -- what evidence did they produce of that? He offered sacrifices constantly, and made no secret of it, now in his home, now at the altars of the state temples, and he made use of divination with as little secrecy. Indeed it had become notorious that Socrates claimed to be guided by ‘the deity:’¹ it was out of this claim, I think, that the charge of bringing in strange deities arose. [3] He was no more bringing in anything strange than are other believers in divination, who rely on augury, oracles, coincidences and sacrifices. For these men's belief is not that the birds or the folk met by accident know what profits the inquirer, but that they are the instruments by which the gods make this known; and that was Socrates' belief too. [4] Only, whereas most men say that the birds or the folk they meet dissuade or encourage them, Socrates said what he meant: for he said that the deity gave him a sign. Many of his companions were counselled by him to do this or not to do that in accordance with the warnings of the deity: and those who followed his advice prospered, and those who rejected it had cause for regret. [5] And yet who would not admit that he wished to appear neither a knave nor a fool to his companions? but he would have been thought both, had he proved to be mistaken when he alleged that his counsel was in accordance with divine revelation. Obviously, then, he would not have given the counsel if he had not been confident that what he said would come true. And who could have inspired him with that confidence but a god? And since he had confidence in the gods, how can he have disbelieved in the existence of the gods? [6] Another way he had of dealing with intimate friends was this: if there was no room for doubt, he advised them to act as they thought best; but if the consequences could not be foreseen, he sent them to the oracle to inquire whether the thing ought to be done. [7] Those who intended to control a house or a city, he said, needed the help of divination. For the craft of carpenter, smith, farmer or ruler, and the theory of such crafts, and arithmetic and economics and generalship might be learned and mastered by the application of human powers; [8] but the deepest secrets of these matters the gods reserved to themselves; they were dark to men. You may plant a field well; but you know not who shall gather the fruits: you may build a house well; but you know not who shall dwell in it: able to command, you cannot know whether it is profitable to command: versed in statecraft, you know not whether it is profitable to guide the state: though, for your delight, you marry a pretty woman, you cannot tell whether she will bring you sorrow: though you form a party among men mighty in the state, you know not whether they will cause you to be driven from the state. [9] If any man thinks that these matters are wholly within the grasp of the human mind and nothing in them is beyond our reason, that man, he said, is irrational. But it is no less irrational to seek the guidance of heaven in matters which men are permitted by the gods to decide for themselves by study: to ask, for instance, Is it better to get an experienced coachman to drive my carriage or a man without experience?² Is it better to get an experienced seaman to steer my ship or a man without experience? So too with what we may know by reckoning, measurement or weighing. To put such questions to the gods seemed to his mind profane. In short, what the gods have granted us to do by help of learning, we must learn; what is hidden from mortals we should try to find out from the gods by divination: for to him that is in their grace the gods grant a sign.

[10] Moreover, Socrates lived ever in the open; for early in the morning he went to the public promenades and training-grounds; in the forenoon he was seen in the market; and the rest of the day he passed just where most people were to be met: he was generally talking, and anyone might listen. Yet none ever knew him to offend against piety and religion in deed or word. [11] He did not even discuss that topic so favoured by other talkers, “the Nature of the Universe”: and avoided speculation on the so-called “Cosmos” of the Professors, how it works, and on the laws that govern the phenomena of the heavens: indeed he would argue that to trouble one's mind with such problems is sheer folly. [12] In the first place, he would inquire, did these thinkers suppose that their knowledge of human affairs was so complete that they must seek these new fields for the exercise of their brains; or that it was their duty to neglect human affairs and consider only things divine? [13] Moreover, he marvelled at their blindness in not seeing that man cannot solve these riddles; since even the most conceited talkers on these problems did not agree in their theories, but behaved to one another like madmen. [14] As some madmen have no fear of danger and others are afraid where there is nothing to be afraid of, as some will do or say anything in a crowd with no sense of shame, while others shrink even from going abroad among men, some respect neither temple nor altar nor any other sacred thing, others worship stocks and stones and beasts, so is it, he held, with those who worry with “Universal Nature.” Some hold that “What is” is one, others that it is infinite in number: some that all things are in perpetual motion, others that nothing can ever be moved at any time: some that all life is birth and decay, others that nothing can ever be born or ever die. [15] Nor were those the only questions he asked about such theorists. Students of human nature, he said, think that they will apply their knowledge in due course for the good of themselves and any others they choose. Do those who pry into heavenly phenomena imagine that, once they have discovered the laws by which these are produced, they will create at their will winds, waters, seasons and such things to their need? Or have they no such expectation, and are they satisfied with knowing the causes of these various phenomena?

[16] Such, then, was his criticism of those who meddle with these matters. His own conversation was ever of human things. The problems he discussed were, What is godly, what is ungodly; what is beautiful, what is ugly; what is just, what is unjust; what is prudence, what is madness; what is courage, what is cowardice; what is a state, what is a statesman; what is government, and what is a governor;--these and others like them, of which the knowledge made a “gentleman,” in his estimation, while ignorance should involve the reproach of “slavishness.”

[17] So, in pronouncing on opinions of his that were unknown to them it is not surprising that the jury erred: but is it not astonishing that they should have ignored matters of common knowledge? [18] For instance, when he was on the Council and had taken the counsellor's oath by which he bound himself to give counsel in accordance with the laws, it fell to his lot to preside in the Assembly when the people wanted to condemn Thrasyllus and Erasinides and their colleagues to death by a single vote. That was illegal, and he refused the motion in spite of popular rancour and the threats of many powerful persons. It was more to him that he should keep his oath than that he should humour the people in an unjust demand and shield himself from threats. [19] For, like most men, indeed, he believed that the gods are heedful of mankind, but with an important difference; for whereas they do not believe in the omniscience of the gods, Socrates thought that they know all things, our words and deeds and secret purposes; that they are present everywhere, and grant signs to men of all that concerns man.³

[20] I wonder, then, how the Athenians can have been persuaded that Socrates was a freethinker, when he never said or did anything contrary to sound religion, and his utterances about the gods and his behaviour towards them were the words and actions of a man who is truly religious and deserves to be thought so.

¹ That immanent ‘divine something,’ as Cicero terms it, which Socrates claimed as his peculiar possession.

² Cyropaedia I. vi. 6.

³ IV. iii, 2; Cyropaedia I. vi. 46.

There are a total of 108 comments on and cross references to this page.

Cross references from Herbert Weir Smyth, A Greek Grammar for Colleges:
2579 [DEPENDENT STATEMENTS INTRODUCED BY hoti OR hôs]: pollakis ethaumasa tisi pote logois Athênaious epeisan hoi grapsamenoi Sôkratên hôs axios eiê thanatou
2915 [men]
2914 [men]
1132 [THE ARTICLE WITH ABSTRACT SUBSTANTIVES]
1265 [THE INTERROGATIVE PRONOUNS]
1849 [INFINITIVE AND PARTICIPLE WITH an]
2107 [THE SUPPLEMENTARY PARTICIPLE IN INDIRECT DISCOURSE]
1992 [A. Object Infinitive after Verbs of Will or Desire]
2725 [ou AND mê WITH THE INFINITIVE IN INDIRECT DISCOURSE]: thaumazô hopôs epeisthêsan Athênaioi Sôkratên peri theous mê sôphronein
1773 [INDICATIVE WITHOUT an]
1831 [OPTATIVE WITH an]
944 [Omission of the Verb]: ei tis eperôtôiê poteron kreitton

Cross references from Raphael Kühner, Bernhard Gerth, Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache (ed. Ildar Ibraguimov):
470 [III. Unbestimmtes Pronomen tis, ti.]
353 [B. Prädikat.]
348 [b) Pluralform.]
411 [Doppelter Akkusativ.]
417 [Fortsetzung.]
417 [Fortsetzung.]
417 [Fortsetzung.]
437 [b. Peri, um, herum.]
463 [Von der Stellung des Artikels.]
391 [a. Die Indikativform.]
396 [Optativ mit an (ken).]
396 [Optativ mit an (ken).]
417 [Fortsetzung.]
354 [Ellipse des Verbs einai.]

Cross references from T. G. Tucker, Commentary on Thucydides: Book 8:
8, 92, 2

Cross references from Harry Thurston Peck, Harpers Dictionary of Classical Antiquities (1898):
omen [Omen]

Cross references from A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities (1890) (eds. William Smith, LLD, William Wayte, G. E. Marindin):
v1p48 [Section of the same.]
v1p1047 [horkos]
asebeias-graphe [asebeias graphê]

Cross references from William Watson Goodwin, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb:
361 [Object Infinitive and Indirect Questions.]
587 [hôste with the Infinitive.]
713 [Section IX: Causal Sentences.]
800 [Infinitive with tou, tôi, and to, as a Noun, in various Constructions.]
206 [Infinitive with an.]
410 [2. With Supposition contrary to Fact.]

Cross references from Basil Lanneau Gildersleeve, Syntax of Classical Greek:
29 [a. With the article:]: hoi grapsamenoi
36 [Adjectives]: en tôi phanerôi

Cross references from Josiah Renick Smith, Xenophon: Memorabilia:
3, 6, 1
1, 1, 6
2, 1, 24
2, 8, 3
1, 6, 11
4, 4, 2
1, 6, 8
1, 4, 18
2, 1, 5
1, 4, 18

Cross references from James Adam, The Republic of Plato:
10, 602D

Cross references from E. C. Marchant, Commentary on Thucydides Book 1:
1, 77, 2

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The Annenberg CPB/Project provided support for entering this text.

This text is based on the following book(s):
Xenophon. Xenophon in Seven Volumes, 4. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; William Heinemann, Ltd., London. 1979.
OCLC: 7127629
ISBN: 0674991869

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