by Aristotle
translated by J. I. Beare
Part 1
Democritus and most of the natural philosophers who treat of
sense-perception proceed quite irrationally, for they represent all
objects of sense as objects of Touch. Yet, if this is really so, it
clearly follows that each of the other senses is a mode of Touch;
but one can see at a glance that this is impossible.
Again, they treat the percepts common to all senses as proper to
one. For [the qualities by which they explain taste viz.] Magnitude
and Figure, Roughness and Smoothness, and, moreover, the Sharpness and
Bluntness found in solid bodies, are percepts common to all the
senses, or if not to all, at least to Sight and Touch. This explains
why it is that the senses are liable to err regarding them, while no
such error arises respecting their proper sensibles; e.g. the sense of
Seeing is not deceived as to Colour, nor is that of Hearing as to
Sound.
On the other hand, they reduce the proper to common sensibles, as
Democritus does with White and Black; for he asserts that the latter
is [a mode of the] rough, and the former [a mode of the] smooth, while
he reduces Savours to the atomic figures. Yet surely no one sense, or,
if any, the sense of Sight rather than any other, can discern the
common sensibles. But if we suppose that the sense of Taste is
better able to do so, then- since to discern the smallest objects in
each kind is what marks the acutest sense-Taste should have been the
sense which best perceived the common sensibles generally, and
showed the most perfect power of discerning figures in general.
Again, all the sensibles involve contrariety; e.g. in Colour White
is contrary to Black, and in Savours Bitter is contrary to Sweet;
but no one figure is reckoned as contrary to any other figure. Else,
to which of the possible polygonal figures [to which Democritus
reduces Bitter] is the spherical figure [to which he reduces Sweet]
contrary?
Again, since figures are infinite in number, savours also should
be infinite; [the possible rejoinder- 'that they are so, only that
some are not perceived'- cannot be sustained] for why should one
savour be perceived, and another not?
This completes our discussion of the object of Taste, i.e. Savour;
for the other affections of Savours are examined in their proper place
in connection with the natural history of Plants.