Aristotle, de gen. et corr. A8, 325a2

. . . But Leucippus thought he had arguments which would assert what is consistent with sense-perception and not do away with coming into being or perishing or motion, or pulrality of existents. He agrees with the appearances to this extent, but he concedes, to those who maintain the One, that there would be no motion without void, and says that the void is non-existent, and that no part of what is is non-existent -- for what is in the strict sense is wholly and fully being. But such being, he says, is not one; there is an infinite number, and they are invisible because of the smallness of the particles. They move in the void (for there is a void), and when they come tohgether they cause coming to be, and when they separate they cause perishing. They have effects and are affected wherever they happen to be in contact (contact does not make them one), but when they are compounded together and entangled they create something. From what is truly one no plurality could come into being, nor a unity form what is truly a plurality -- that is impossible. But as Empedocles and some of the other philosophers say that things are affected through their pores, so in his view all alteration and all being affected comes abut in this way: dissolution and destruction, and similarly growth, occur when solid objects slip in through the void.